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This paper forecasts the retirement patterns and resources of the Early Baby Boomers by 
estimating forward-looking dynamic models of labor force participation, wealth accumulation 
and pension and Social Security benefit claiming for older workers using seven waves of HRS-
data.  The two most important innovations of our proposed approach are the use of alternative 
measures of pension entitlements and the associated incentives, and accounting for subjective 
expectations about future work. Our main findings are that the Early Baby Boomers will work 
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 The last decade has witnessed a marked reduction in the generosity of retiree 
benefits, notably with the termination of defined benefit (DB) plans and their replacement 
with defined contribution (DC) plans which shift the investment risk to the worker.  
According to a report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS, September 2007) on 
“Pension Sponsorship and Participation” the percentage of private-sector workers 
between the ages of 25 and 64 who participated in employer-sponsored retirement plans 
fell from 50.3 percent to 43.2 percent.1  An important policy question is how these trends 
will affect the material well being of future retirees.   
Labor force participation rates at older ages have increased over the last decade.  
Figure 1 shows labor force participation rates from the Current Population Survey (CPS) 
of men by age group and how it evolved since 1990.  For example, the labor force 
participation rate of men 60-64 rose from 55.5 percent in 1990 to 58.6 percent in 2006.  
The increase was even greater – 26.0 percent to 34.4 percent – for those aged 65-69.  
Trends for women have been similar.  Hurd and Rohwedder (2008) suggest that part of 
this increase is due to the shift in employer-provided pensions from DB to DC.  Michaud 
and van Soest (2008) find that also the elimination of the Social Security earnings test has 
contributed to this trend.  Other factors may well have been at work at the same time, 
such as improvements in health.  
Whether these trends towards longer working lives continue is an important 
question for policy makers because of its direct impact on Social Security and Medicare 
finances on the one hand and on financial well-being of future retirees on the other hand. 
In this paper we investigate the question of future labor force participation for the next 
cohort of retirees: the Early Baby Boomers, that is, those born between 1948 and 1953.  
For that purpose we develop a dynamic model of labor force participation consistent with 
forward-looking behavior. We provide reduced form estimates and leave estimation of 
the full-fletched model to future work. 
 
                                                 
1 Statistics are based on CPS data. 
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The literature on estimating retirement models is extensive, covering a wide array 
of approaches ranging from static to dynamic models, and from structural to reduced 
form estimation.  Our model, while not being a fully dynamic, structural model of 
retirement, is in the spirit of structural models as exemplified in the work of Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1986), Rust et al. (2001) and French (2005). Estimation of a fully structural 
model with pensions, Social Security claiming, savings and work decisions under 
uncertainty has not been accomplished.   We will incorporate all of those elements by 
using an approximation to complex decision rules derived from this type of models, 
following Keane and Wolpin (2002) who applied this method in another context, and 
Blau (1998) on joint labor force decisions of couples.  We see this approach as 
complementary to the structural approach for informing policy makers about future 
retirement patterns and resources of the elderly.2  We consider two important extensions 
of prior work: 
 
First, we use innovative methods of measuring pension entitlements that allow 
performing our analysis on full, population-representative samples:  the assessment of the 
impact of pensions on retirement in general-purpose surveys has been difficult due to 
data limitations, such as missing information on the variables of interest, measurement 
error, etc.3  We use pension information derived from respondents’ self-reports in a way 
that reduces the effect of missing information and measurement error (in particular in 
reports on plan type). Chan and Stevens (2004) argue that such self-reported information 
enhances the identification of the effects of pension incentives on retirement behavior.4 
 Second, we account for individuals’ subjective expectations about future work.  In 
face of extended life spans and increasing risk born by the individual (investment risk in 
                                                 
2 The main disadvantage of our approach is that we cannot consider counterfactual experiments for policies 
that have not occurred in the past as well as policies for which a clear policy-lever cannot be identified 
from approximation to the decision rules. For example, assessing the effect of a large reform such as 
introducing retirement accounts is better analyzed within a structural model at the expense of 
simplifications in the choice environment of individuals (e.g. Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004). On the other 
hand, Keane and Wolpin (2002) discuss the type of policies for which approximations can be informative. 
3 Prior studies have relied on samples with matched administrative information on pension structure, at the 
cost of being left with substantially smaller and potentially selected samples (e.g., Kotlikoff and Wise, 
1989; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004).   
4 Chan and Stevens (2004) have estimated models of retirement expectations as a function of future pension 
gains derived from self-reports.  In the case of missing information they exclude the affected observations, 
resulting in a selected sample for analysis. 
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DC plans and rising cost of medical care) future retirees may consider working longer.  
Integrating expectations about future work in our model is therefore important, given our 
goal to use our estimates to forecast retirement patterns and economic resources for the 
Early Baby Boomers.  Our estimations use seven waves of HRS data.5   
 To verify the fit of the reduced-form version of the model we simulate outcomes 
for the 1931-1941 cohort from 1992 to 2004 and compare with observed outcomes from 
the data. Overall this comparison is very favorable, while still leaving some room for 
improvements, notably in the profile of Social Security claiming at ages 62, 63 and 64, 
and the profile of median wealth.  
 Comparing predicted patterns of the Early Baby Boomers with the original HRS 
cohort we find that the Early Baby Boomers will work longer and claim Social Security 





 The data for the current analysis are from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
(Juster and Suzman, 1995), a survey funded by the National Institute on Aging, with 
additional funding from the Social Security Administration.  The HRS is a biennial 
longitudinal survey of individuals 51 or older.  Data from eight waves, fielded from 1992 
through 2006, have been collected; each wave has close to 20,000 interviews.  The 
sample is representative of the U.S. population, except for certain oversamples, for which 
weights are used to calculate population averages.  In the initial wave the target 
population was from the cohorts born in 1931 through 1941, and they were 
approximately aged 51-61 at interview.  In 1998 new cohorts were added making the 
HRS representative of the population aged 51 or over.  In 2004 new cohorts aged 51-56 
were again added, the so-called Early Baby Boomers.   
 The HRS questionnaire has sections on health, economic status, labor market 
activity, and family linkages, among other topics.  Respondents report labor force status, 
                                                 
5 Over this period the original HRS cohort (aged 51-61 at baseline in 1992) has almost completed its full 
transition into retirement. The estimation of pension entitlements uses some additional information from 
the latest wave of HRS (wave 8 collected in 2006). 
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information about employment, and, if working, whether they participate in a pension on 
their job.  If they do participate, they report their pension plan type (DB, DC, or both) and 
the age at which benefits are fully available as well as any earlier age at which they may 
be partially available.   
 
 
2.1 Estimating Pension Entitlements 
 To measure pension entitlements we use an innovative method developed at 
RAND by Hurd and Rohwedder for which some first results are presented in Hurd and 
Rohwedder (2007).  The estimation is implemented in a way that reduces the impact of 
misreported plan type and missing information, both of which have posed major barriers 
in the past to using the self-reports on pensions.  The point of departure is that the most 
accurate and most complete report on pension entitlements is obtained immediately after 
a respondent leaves a job,6 i.e., when she just had to make important decisions about the 
disposition of the pension.  At this time HRS collects a full inventory of pension type and 
values.  With the original HRS cohort having almost completed its transition into 
retirement we have a full set of self-reports on pension entitlements at various points in 
time leading up to the separation from a job (often associated with retirement), and 
observations on the realizations of pension entitlements for this cohort.  Relating these 
outcomes to prior self-reports, Hurd and Rohwedder obtain estimates of the probabilities 
of claiming benefits from a pension at a certain date in the future, and the associated 
amounts.  Estimation takes into account self-reported eligibility ages, and rich sets of 
covariates relating to pension entitlements (see Appendix 1 for more detail).7   
 
 
2.2 Social Security Entitlements 
                                                 
6 Leaving a job does not have to coincide with retirement.  Over the eight waves of HRS that are currently 
available, there are about 4,000 separations from the job held in 1992 that involve the disposition of at least 
one pension plan. 
7 It can be augmented to also take into account information from employer-provided summary plan 
descriptions. 
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 To estimate Social Security entitlements at possible future claiming ages we use 
Social Security earnings and apply the Social Security rules.8  For respondents who gave 
consent, we have access to Social Security administrative records on their earning 
histories. The fraction having given consent varies by cohort (75% for HRS respondents, 
65% for Early Boomers). Kapteyn et al. (2006) and Haider and Solon (2000) report quite 
mild selection effects when analyzing the characteristics associated with a match; so we 
do not make any adjustment to the weights when producing statistics in this paper.9  
The information contained in the earnings history file allows computing the 
average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) which is the basis for the computation of 
Social Security benefits. It is calculated as the average of the highest 35 years of 
earnings. Earnings are indexed to wage growth. We also determine who is eligible to 
Social Security benefits by using the associated quarters of coverage. If a respondent has 




3. Trends in Outcomes and Initial Conditions across Cohorts  
 
 Our estimations below impose a fair amount of complex structure on the data to 
arrive at predictions of the labor force participation and resources of the Early Baby 
Boomers.’  Examining trends in the raw data, both for outcomes as well as for control 
variables, gives a preview of what we might expect to find from in our model estimations 
(and also a reality check).  In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics for females and 
males from three different birth year cohorts observed in the HRS survey when they were 
age 51 to 56: “HRS” stands for the original HRS cohort born between 1936 and 1941;10 
“WB” denotes the War Babies born between 1942 and 1947 and “EBB” are the Early 
Baby Boomers who were born between 1948-1953.  At ages 51 through 56 each of these 
birth year cohorts was newly inducted to the HRS survey, so the statistics do not suffer 
                                                 
8 Social Security earnings files are restricted data.  We use these under the provisions of the Umbrella Data 
Protection Plan established between HRS Michigan and the RAND Center for the Study of Aging. 
9 In future work we plan to incorporate this adjustment. 
10 The original HRS cohort included additional birth years, those born between 1931 and 1935, who were 
between age 57 and 61 at baseline. 
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from attrition bias.  Note that any of the comparisons will be cross-section that mix time 
and cohort effects.  This does not matter for our purposes, however, as we are interested 
in finding differences in the initial conditions of the three cohorts. 
 
 Labor force participation.  For males there are only very small differences across 
cohorts suggesting a slight drop in labor force participation from one cohort to the next.  
Among females we notice an increase in labor force participation from 63.7 percent to 
73.5 percent reflecting the fact that younger cohorts of females have a stronger 
attachment to the labor market.  Especially the fraction of females working full-time has 
increased in about the same manner as the portion not in the labor force has fallen.  
Looking at job types the fraction of blue-collar jobs has decreased for both sexes.  These 
trends would suggest that among women we would expect later retirement for younger 
cohorts in our more detailed analysis below. 
    
 Health.  For the HRS cohort in 1992 we find a fairly large difference between 
males and females in the fraction reporting fair or poor health, with females appearing in 
worse health (20.6 vs. 16.5 percent).  However that difference shrinks to almost nothing 
among 51 to 56 year olds in 2004 when the fraction of males in fair or poor health (21.2 
percent) has caught up to about the same level observed among females (22.8 percent).  
These developments are also reflected in the increasing rates of mild health conditions 
such as high blood pressure, diabetes and respiratory problems. In summary, later cohorts 
in their early 50s appear to be in worse health, with the trend being more pronounced 
among men posing potential impediments to staying in the labor force longer. 
 
 Expectations.  The subjective probabilities of working past age 62 and the 
subjective probabilities of working past age 65 are higher for successive cohorts, both for 
male and female workers, pointing again towards potentially longer working lives for the 
Early Baby Boomers. 
 
 Pensions. Pension coverage (having any pension on the job) has increased for 
women (52.9 percent in 1992; 58.0 in 2004), while remaining about the same for males 
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across cohorts.  The well-known shift in employer-provided pensions from DB to DC 
plans is clearly visible in these tables.  The fraction of workers reporting a DB plan on 
their current job has dropped from 34.9 to 28.5 percent among female workers and from 
42.4 to 30.4 percent among male workers.  This trend is mirrored by a similar upward 
trend in the fraction reporting a DC plan on the current job.  The value of pension wealth 
entitlements from the current job is larger for later cohorts at the mean, but at the median 
the picture is more mixed.  At the median we only observe clear increases among female 
workers. 
 
 Wealth.  “Males living in couples” is the only group that shows trends of strictly 
increasing wealth at the mean across cohorts, both for financial and non-housing wealth.  
However, even for them a different picture of either flat or slightly lower wealth emerges 
when looking at medians.  For all other groups, means and medians show mixtures of 
higher and lower wealth across cohorts.  From these patterns it is difficult to make a 
prediction with respect to future retirement patterns.  Heterogeneity is likely to be 
important.   
 
 
4. Econometric Model 
 
The conceptual framework underlying our analysis is consistent with a structural 
life-cycle model such as in Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), Rust et al. (2001) or Blau 
(2005): the individual is assumed to maximize lifetime utility. In any given period the 
individual chooses whether to work and the amount (part-time or full-time) and 
consumption (wealth accumulation);11 we augment this with the choice of whether to 
claim benefits from Social Security.  Because retirement is increasingly less observed to 
be an absorbing state we allow individuals to return to work, part-time or full-time.   
                                                 
11 The measure of wealth accumulation includes assets held in DC plans on the current job. 
 9
Keane and Wolpin (2002) show the feasibility, in simulation and in application, of 
estimating an approximation of a forward-looking structural model.12  This simplification 
is suitable to our analysis, since our goal is to forecast the retirement patterns and 
resources of Early Baby Boomers under the current regime. 
 We use an approximation to the decision rules leading to a multiple-decision 
dynamic panel data model.  The decision rules, which are formulated to be consistent 
with a forward-looking model, depend on the state at the beginning of a given period and 
incorporate forward-looking measures of incentives such as accruals or option values of 
delaying claiming Social Security benefits and expected pension wealth. We consider 
three decisions for an individual in period t: work ,it wy  (none, part-time, or full-time 
work); the binary decisions of claiming Social Security benefits ,it sy  and assets ,it ay .  
Denote by , , , ,( , , , ) 'it it w it s it p it aY y y y y=  the vector of decisions for period t.  Since some of 
these outcomes are binary we model them as a mapping from a latent index *ity  which is 
the approximation to the net value function of each alternative from a forward-looking 
problem:  
*
, 1( )it it i t it i ity x y f η ε−= Φ +Γ + ϒ + + . 
The vector ( )itxΦ  represents the dependence of decision rules on a vector of standard 
observable characteristics itx (such as socioeconomic status and health), itf  is a vector of 
forward-looking measures of incentives related to pensions and Social Security benefits.  
The approximation includes lagged decision variables in the specification which is in 
contrast to static models of retirement behavior. This is consistent with models that 
include transition costs for labor market transitions and allows for feedback effects from 
one decision to the other over time.13  Finally, iη  is a vector of individual specific 
unobserved heterogeneity and itε  captures shocks that can be serially correlated.  
 Not all decisions are made every period because of specific program rules (e.g., 
early and normal retirement ages in Social Security and pension plans). Hence the 
                                                 
12 Estimation of a fully structural model such as ours would be computationally intensive and a multi-year 
undertaking. 
13 There are trivial restrictions imposed onΓ  for decision variables (SS and DB pension claiming) 
pertaining to absorbing states. Lagged claiming status does not enter the claiming equation. 
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decision rule is not the same for every individual and year. In particular, 
*
1( ; , )it it it ity G y y w−=  where itw  are characteristics that determine the choice set in year t 
and G is the mapping from latent indices to decisions.  Such a model provides a rich view 
of the dynamics in decisions made by individuals in the HRS.  Estimation is by simulated 
maximum likelihood (e.g. Michaud, 2005) using seven waves of HRS data.14  
  In each equation, we include an extensive set of covariates controlling for 
demographics, health and job characteristics. Table 2 gives sample means and standard 
deviations for the estimation sample. The estimation sample consists of respondents 
initially observed working in the age group 51-56. We conduct separate analyses for 
females and males. 
We distinguish three labor market states: full-time (working 30+ hours a week), 
part-time work and inactivity. The “inactive” include the disabled and those unemployed. 
Social Security benefit claiming status is defined from self-reports on when benefits were 
first claimed.  
Wealth is defined as the sum of financial (checking and savings, CDs, stocks, 
bonds and IRAs) and real components (housing, etc). All monetary amounts are 
expressed in 2004 US dollars. Since the wealth distribution is skewed, a transformation is 
necessary to forecast adequately the evolution of the distribution of wealth. Because of 
non-linearities in the dynamic model, it is not sufficient to predict the mean correctly. We 
use a generalization of the inverse hyperbolic sine transform, proposed MacKinnon and 
Magee (1990). First denote the variable of interest y , here wealth. The hyperbolic sine 
transform is  
 exp( ) exp( )sinh( )
2
y yy x − −= =   
The inverse of the hyperbolic sin transform is 
 1 2 0.5sinh ( ) ( ) log( (1 ) )x y h y y y−= = = + +   
This transformation allows dealing with respondents with zero or negative wealth. For 
large values of y, it coincides with the log transformation. However, this transformation is 
                                                 
14 Michaud (2005) shows how simulations from such a model (of work and SS claiming) for couples match 
closely observed outcomes in the HRS while a static model does a poor job.  By allowing for heterogeneity, 
such model also allows disentangling time-invariant heterogeneity from true state-dependence effects 
which are important when forecasting future retirement profiles.  
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too rigid to capture the extreme skewness of the distribution of the long right tail. We can 
generalize such transformation, first allowing for a shape parameter θ , 
 ( ) ( ) /r y h yθ θ=   
The additional parameter allows correcting for the extreme skewness. We can then 
specify the regression model as 
 2( ) , (0, )r y x Nβ ε ε σ= + ∼ .  
A further generalization is to introduce a location parameter γ  such that the new 
transformation becomes 
 ( ) ( )( )
'( )





=   
where 2 1'( ) (1 )h γ γ −= + . We can specify the same regression model in terms of the 
transformation g. The shape parameters can be estimated from the concentrated 
likelihood for ,θ γ . Upon estimation, we can simulate  
 ˆg xβ ση= +   
 
where η  is a standard normal draw. Given this draw, we retransform to obtain 
 
( ) '( ) ( )
sinh[ '( ) ( )]
h y h g h
h g hy
θ γ θ γ γ







Based on preliminary estimates, we select 1/15, 3/ 4θ γ= = . These are held fixed in 
estimation. In future work, we will estimate these parameters jointly with other 
parameters of the model. 
Controls other than lagged variables and initial conditions can be divided into 
three groups. For most outcomes, we use the initial value so that we will not need to 
model their age pattern in the simulations.  
First, we consider the measure of expected pension wealth constructed as 
discussed above.  We take logs as to minimize the effect of outliers. We include an 
indicator for whether someone reports having at least one plan and whether he is 
currently eligible to at least one pension plan. We complement the controls for private 
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pension wealth with controls that capture Social Security wealth. We control separately 
for the average indexed monthly earnings, the lifetime earning measure used to compute 
Social Security benefits, and quarters of coverage. We also include the wage rate at 
baseline, the spouse’s income and other household income.  
The second group of variables consists of demographics such as age, race and 
ethnicity, marital status, living arrangements and education. Health enters the estimations 
in three ways. First, we consider whether the respondent self-reports being in fair or poor 
health. We add whether the respondent has been diagnosed in the past with a severe 
condition such as heart disease, stroke or cancer. We do the same for milder chronic 
conditions such as diabetes, hypertension and respiratory problems. Finally, we include 
measures of disability such as having IADL or ADL limitations. All these health 
variables are measured at baseline. 
The last group of controls captures individuals’ expectations: the subjective 
probability of working past age 62 and 65, asked at baseline, enters as a control for labor 
force participation expectations; and the subjective probability of living past age 75 as a 
control for the time horizon of the respondent which may affect his decisions. These 
expectations play an important role in forecasting future retirement patterns in that they 
capture changes in the environment or other factors that may be changing over time in a 
way that the model cannot capture relying only on observed current trends.15  Hurd 
(1999) documents the predictive power of these subjective expectations for subsequent 
retirement behavior. Hurd and Rohwedder (2008) estimate that changes in pension 
coverage, plan type and benefit eligibility ages explain some of the change in anticipated 
employment as measured by subjective probabilities, but not all.  
Because, we cannot effectively control for all relevant variables influencing 
respondents’ outcomes, we allow for correlation in unobserved heterogeneity.  We 
assume this term can be decomposed into a time-variant and permanent component 
 
 it i itu η ε= +  
                                                 
15 For example, individuals may perceive changes in uncertainty with respect to the receipt or generosity of 
their pensions or changing conditions or attitudes about working at older ages. 
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where ~ (0, )it N εε Σ . The permanent unobservables iη are potentially correlated with the 
initial state 0iy , which is known as the initial conditions problem. We assume that 
0~ ( , )i iN y ηα Π Ω  where 0i i iyα η= −Π  is the residual of the linear projection. This is the 
initial conditions solution proposed by Wooldridge (2000, 2005). One could experiment 
with more flexible functional forms. 
 Each outcome is observed according to a non-invertible mapping *( )k itg y  The 
likelihood contribution of individual i is given by 
 
,( , )
Pr( | ; ) ( ; )
i i
i i i vi
B y w




= Ω∫   
where i T i iv ι α ε= ⊗ + , 1( ',..., ' ) 'i iTε ε ,  1 0( ,..., , , )i i iT i iw x x z y=  and ( , , )i iB y w θ  denote the 
bounds of the set of errors consistent with data ,i iy w  for parameters 
( (), , , ,vech( ),vech( ))ε αθ = Φ Γ ϒ Π Σ Ω . The size of the integral depends on the sequence 
observed because death truncates the observation of other outcomes. For year t , 
errors itv , and employment outcome j  the vector of errors to model is given by 
 it j itv M v=   
 



















with  jD  an  1J −  identity matrix with a column filled with -1 inserted at position j . 
Creating a block diagonal matrix with these transformation matrices leads to the 
transformation  
 
 i i iv M v=   
and it follows from the random effects assumption that 
  
 14
 var( ) ( ) '
i ii i i T T i
v M J I Mα εΩ = = ⊗Ω + ⊗Σ   
where 
iT
J  is a matrix of ones (size iT ). The integral can be simulated using the GHK 
simulator (see Train, 2002). We use 10 Halton draws and compute panel robust standard 
errors using the Sandwich estimator of the covariance matrix.   
 We use the estimates from our model, which is mainly estimated over individuals 
of the original HRS cohort (age 51-61 in 1992) and those from the War Babies cohort 
(born between 1942-1947), to produce out-of-sample predictions of the Early Baby 
Boomers’ retirement patterns and retirement resources, given their observed 





5.1 Estimation Results 
In this version of the paper we provide reduced form estimates of the dynamic 
model developed above.  We estimate separately a multinomial probit of labor force 
participation, a OLS of transformed wealth (using the inverse hyperbolic sine transform) 
and a probit of Social Security claiming. Hence, we assume no correlation in 
unobservables between the equations. 
We first discuss the parameter estimates we obtain from estimation. Coefficients 
along with t-statistics are presented in Tables 3 and 4 for females and males, respectively. 
The magnitudes are difficult to interpret since some of the parameters are only identified 
up to scale (in the probit and multinomial choice model). However, we can discuss the 
sign and the statistical significance of some of the key covariates.  We focus on those that 
appear to affect the outcomes of our forecasts in important ways: 
 We estimate the state-dependence and feedback effects to be quite large and 
strongly significant (many of the lagged variables are significant at the 1-percent level).  
For males, wealth and pension wealth show the anticipated sign consistent with an 
income effect on participation.  Indicators of bad (or worse) health generally have a 
negative effect on labor force participation and wealth accumulation.  These effects 
appear to be more pronounced for women with parameter estimates on several health 
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variables being significant at the 1-percent level.  The subjective probabilities of working 
past age 62, which we include to capture factors that we cannot capture with the other 




 To assess whether the model produces sensible forecasts, we conduct the 
following experiment. We use as a baseline those aged 51 through 56 in 1992 and 
simulate their outcomes over the 90s until 2004. We then compare actual and simulated 
profiles for full-time work, Social Security benefit receipt and median wealth. Figures 2, 
3 and 4 show the results.  The fit is generally good but some areas remain to be improved, 
particularly the profile of Social Security claiming at ages 62, 63 and 64, and the profile 
of median wealth.  
 
 
5.3 Forecast for the Early Baby Boomer Cohort 
Figure 5 shows the age profile of the forecasts of labor force status for the Early 
Baby Boomer cohort by sex.  For example, at age 60 about 55 percent of males of this 
cohort are predicted to work full time and about 20 percent at age 65.  The figures for 
working full time are very similar among women, but in addition they engage in more 
part time work. As a result when focusing on “any work” (i.e. taking full-time and part-
time together) we find that labor force participation among women is higher than that for 
men at any age up to about age 67. 
Figure 6 shows the forecasts of Social Security benefit receipts for men and 
women by age.  At age 62 about 67 percent of women will have claimed Social Security; 
that is a higher fraction than is forecast for men (about 60 percent).  This difference 






Comparison with Older Cohorts 
Figures 7 and 8 compare these forecasts to simulations for the older HRS cohort.  
Note that the estimates underlying the simulations for the HRS cohort directly reflect the 
actual experience of that cohort. We find that Early Baby Boomers are predicted to 
engage in full-time work at substantially higher rates well into their mid-sixties. The 
difference is larger for women and applies to an earlier age range: between ages 55 and 
63 the fraction of women working full-time is predicted to be almost 10 percent higher on 
average; from age 64 to 66 it is about 5 percent higher than that of the HRS cohort. For 
males the differences are mostly concentrated in the sixties but reach well into their 
seventies; they amount to predicted increases in full-time work of about 5 percentage 
points on average.   
In summary, these forecasts suggest a continuation of the trends observed in CPS 
data to date (Figure 1); that is, trends towards higher labor force participation for men and 
women, in particular at older ages. 
Figure 8 shows similar patterns for Social Security benefit receipt: the Early Baby 
Boomers are predicted to claim benefits later, and the difference is a little more 
pronounced for women. 
 We find no clear patterns for wealth (not shown).  This is not particularly 
surprising.  While the raw data showed strong increases in wealth across cohorts for 
males living in couples the trends seemed more mixed for all other groups, and in 
particular at the median.  In addition, wealth inequality appears to be greater among Early 





 Our objective in this work has been to forecast the retirement patterns and 
resources of the Early Baby Boomers to answer the question whether recent trends of 
increased labor force participation at older ages will continue. 
 To that end we developed a forward-looking dynamic models of labor force 
participation, wealth accumulation and pension and Social Security benefit claiming for 
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older workers using seven waves of HRS data.  The two most important innovations of 
our approach were the use of alternative measures of pension entitlements and the 
associated incentives, and accounting for subjective expectations about future work.   
We estimated a reduced from version of the model and the parameter estimates 
from the model show significant effects for many of the key variables and with the 
anticipated sign.  This is also the case for the subjective expectations about future work 
that we included.  We verify the fit of the model by simulating outcomes for the 1931-
1941 cohort from 1992 to 2004 and comparing with observed outcomes from the data.  
The result is favorable and so we turned to forecasting the outcomes for the Early Baby 
Boomers:  they are predicted to engage in full-time work at substantially higher rates well 
into their mid-sixties. The differences are sizeable, in particular for women: between ages 
55 and 63 the fraction of women working full-time is predicted to be almost 10 percent 
higher on average; from age 64 to 66 it is about 5 percent higher than that of the HRS 
cohort. For males the differences appear mostly in their sixties but reach well into their 
seventies; they amount to increases in full-time work of about 5 percentage points on 
average across this fairly wide age range.   
In summary, these forecasts suggest a continuation of the trends observed in CPS 
data which imply higher labor force participation for men and women, in particular at 
older ages. 
 In future research we aim to implement the estimation of the fully-dynamic 
forward looking model that we developed, and to find the relative contribution of those 
factors that we model directly compared to factors that lie outside of our model, but are 
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Table 1:  Cohort comparisons: 51-56 year olds in 1992 (HRS), 1998 (WB) and in 
2004 (EEB), weighted.  Amounts in thousands of $2004. 
Variables HRS WB EBB HRS WB EBB
Survey year 1992 1998 2004 1992 1998 2004
Individual characteristics
Work for pay 0.637 0.693 0.735 0.826 0.821 0.813
full-time 0.430 0.482 0.513 0.719 0.726 0.718
part-time 0.202 0.205 0.216 0.106 0.092 0.092
not in labor force 0.363 0.307 0.265 0.174 0.179 0.187
self-rated health fair/poor 0.206 0.216 0.228 0.165 0.179 0.212
severe health condition 0.163 0.190 0.189 0.166 0.192 0.179
mild health condition 0.445 0.465 0.529 0.454 0.525 0.534
subj. prob. work past 62* 40.9 43.3 45.9 48.5 53.7 55.3
subj. prob. work past 65* 22.2 26.2 29.4 27.9 34.1 36.4
subj. prob. live past 75 66.4 69.0 66.1 62.9 62.6 61.3
Current job characteristics*
professional job 0.310 0.363 0.379 0.370 0.384 0.391
white collar job 0.528 0.508 0.491 0.233 0.235 0.238
blue collar job 0.162 0.129 0.129 0.397 0.381 0.370
any pension 0.529 0.562 0.580 0.617 0.636 0.592
any DB 0.349 0.313 0.285 0.424 0.398 0.304
any DC 0.275 0.374 0.420 0.345 0.426 0.459
pension wealth       mean 53.5 55.4 63.5 153.7 166.5 202.0
                               median 53.5 55.4 66.6 77.2 80.9 66.1
Household characteristics ($'000)
Couples - means
financial wealth 87.8 118.5 104.7 71.3 88.5 116.9
non-housing wealth 274.3 301.2 288.5 244.7 275.9 325.5
Singles - means
financial wealth 30.3 43.2 35.0 92.0 57.4 61.4
non-housing wealth 64.2 96.4 87.4 195.5 142.1 128.2
Couples - medians
financial wealth 16.7 20.0 12.0 14.7 13.9 11.0
non-housing wealth 78.6 101.0 79.5 74.7 71.4 71.0
Singles - medians
financial wealth 1.1 0.7 0.3 5.1 1.3 1.5
non-housing wealth 9.1 11.0 8.5 25.3 18.5 14.0
N 6163 4988 2392 5323 2691 1548
Authors' calculations. Weighted.
*Statistics related to current employment computed over working people only.
Female Male
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Estimation Sample 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
outcomes
full-time 0.609 0.488 0.776 0.417
part-time 0.255 0.436 0.088 0.284
transformed wealth 34.397 26.016 37.368 25.343
controls
log pension wealth 10.361 1.276 11.138 1.444
age/10 0.516 0.177 0.524 0.178
age/10 squared 0.298 0.193 0.306 0.196
married 0.673 0.469 0.874 0.332
widowed 0.072 0.259 0.012 0.108
other adults living in hh 0.492 0.500 0.553 0.497
non-labor income/1000 38.889 42.082 35.658 40.663
severe hlt condition 0.121 0.354 0.120 0.354
mild hlt condition 0.377 0.583 0.404 0.579
1 iadl 0.063 0.243 0.055 0.228
1-2 adl 0.044 0.206 0.031 0.172
self-reported hlth poor 0.115 0.320 0.114 0.318
black 0.172 0.378 0.102 0.303
hispanic 0.053 0.224 0.074 0.262
less than high school 0.154 0.361 0.153 0.361
college education 0.439 0.496 0.491 0.500
career occupation 0.777 0.416 0.747 0.435
professional job 0.327 0.469 0.349 0.477
blue-collar job 0.174 0.379 0.414 0.493
# quarters coverage 89.168 34.358 122.694 31.901
log AIME 0.700 0.104 0.795 0.078
wage rate 15.670 15.663 23.023 22.162
any pension 0.605 0.489 0.670 0.470
subj. prob work past 62 41.491 37.903 47.967 39.152
subj.prob work past 65 22.301 31.644 27.170 34.021
subj. prob survive past 75 68.671 27.954 61.668 31.013
prob missing 0.016 0.124 0.039 0.193
NT
N








Table 3: Estimation Results – Females 
Controls full-time part-time trans. wlth ss claim
lagged outcome
lag full-time 3.25328*** 1.63480*** 0.64916 -2.06957***
[23.03] [12.20] [1.09] [-9.35]
lag part-time 1.97823*** 2.92826*** 0.27327 -1.39690***
[12.98] [22.48] [0.43] [-5.58]
lag trans. wealth -0.00932*** -0.00615** 0.61311*** -0.00136
[-3.30] [-2.19] [29.05] [-0.33]
lag receive SSben -0.3614 -0.1728 -1.77572*
[-1.58] [-0.95] [-1.89]
initial conditions
i. part-time -0.55234*** 0.54373*** -0.19061 -0.35623*
[-4.36] [4.76] [-0.34] [-1.80]
i. self-employed -1.30577*** -1.24353*** 0.07726 -0.24793
[-6.56] [-7.02] [0.08] [-0.78]
i. trans. wlth 0.00328 0.00839*** 0.13973*** -0.0026
[1.12] [2.78] [5.30] [-0.65]
i. log pension wlth -0.18016* -0.11532 0.77635 0.01276
[-1.72] [-1.05] [1.57] [0.06]
age/10 0.1888 -0.30063 -1.59527 4.70842***
[0.31] [-0.49] [-0.66] [6.06]
age/10 sq -0.93084*** -0.14006 2.27707*
[-2.76] [-0.44] [1.76]
i. married 0.02889 -0.07719 -0.35716 0.21482
[0.24] [-0.57] [-0.59] [1.05]
i. widowed 0.01032 -0.07376 -1.06634 0.59863*
[0.06] [-0.36] [-1.17] [1.95]
i. other adults hh 0.20324** 0.09034 -0.58757 -0.20739
[2.28] [0.96] [-1.33] [-1.36]  
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i. severe hlt 0.09081 0.21284 -0.47906 0.03314
[0.71] [1.52] [-0.69] [0.15]
i. mild hlt -0.20985*** -0.19300** -1.27400*** 0.2131
[-2.76] [-2.14] [-3.01] [1.50]
i. some iadl 0.22296 0.09652 -1.10513 -0.20786
[1.24] [0.62] [-1.35] [-0.66]
i. some adl -0.19722 -0.77713*** 0.64386 0.24426
[-0.96] [-2.72] [0.54] [0.71]
i. srh fair/poor -0.75908*** -0.54481*** -1.13195 -0.12117
[-4.82] [-3.27] [-1.33] [-0.39]
black 0.05003 0.21583 -2.69964*** 0.05079
[0.39] [1.57] [-4.08] [0.22]
hispanic 0.23682 0.05092 -3.35279*** -0.27654
[1.32] [0.22] [-3.35] [-0.86]
l.t. high school -0.10493 -0.13177 -1.63678** -0.2759
[-0.72] [-0.88] [-2.34] [-1.01]
college ed 0.17867 0.20798 0.69599 -0.24392
[1.60] [1.63] [1.36] [-1.19]
i. non-labor income -0.00151 0.00099 0.08729*** -0.00346
[-1.02] [0.71] [9.43] [-1.36]
i. career occup. -0.0638 0.08698 -1.08271** 0.27293
[-0.60] [0.73] [-2.15] [1.53]
i. professional 0.17029 -0.03085 0.95111* -0.181
[1.54] [-0.24] [1.73] [-0.91]
i. blue-collar -0.26436** -0.11776 -0.49685 0.30456
[-2.16] [-0.89] [-0.80] [1.34]
i. quarters cov. -0.00137 0.00111 -0.01176 0.01047**
[-0.55] [0.39] [-0.93] [2.16]
i. log aime 2.43377*** -0.65069 3.85838 -2.15302
[2.64] [-0.72] [0.79] [-0.90]
i. wage rate -0.00882** -0.00700** -0.0025 -0.0076
[-2.12] [-2.15] [-0.10] [-0.74]
i. any pension 0.52694** 0.18699 -0.32585 0.0419
[2.15] [0.73] [-0.28] [0.09]
i. subj.prob.work62 0.00687*** 0.00056 -0.01670** -0.00667***
[4.19] [0.31] [-2.13] [-2.66]
i. subj.prob.work65 0.00321* 0.00222 -0.00895 -0.00591**
[1.67] [1.01] [-0.95] [-2.18]
i. subj.prob.live75 -0.00227 0.00153 -0.00477 -0.00029
[-1.40] [0.86] [-0.57] [-0.10]
i. prob missing -0.64433 -0.4281 -1.85299 -1.00168
[-1.49] [-0.98] [-1.18] [-1.13]
Notes: point estimates along with t-statistics based on panel robust standard 
errors, *** <0.01, ** <0.05, * <0.10  
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Table 4: Estimation Results – Males 
Controls full-time part-time trans. wlth ss claim
lagged outcome
lag full-time 2.60883*** 1.15676*** 1.12900* -1.90997***
[23.81] [8.17] [1.95] [-10.52]
lag part-time 1.41089*** 2.56245*** -0.6578 -1.11957***
[8.93] [16.91] [-0.92] [-4.34]
lag trans. wealth -0.00847*** -0.00451 0.54837*** 0.00188
[-3.30] [-1.39] [23.01] [0.51]
lag receive SSben -0.53035*** -0.13776 -0.78712
[-2.82] [-0.70] [-0.97]
initial conditions
i. part-time -0.38575*** 0.64191*** 1.47384** 0.38758*
[-2.68] [4.25] [2.03] [1.67]
i. self-employed -1.02955*** -0.67833*** 0.05835 -0.15297
[-7.51] [-4.07] [0.08] [-0.68]
i. trans. wlth 0.00202 0.00413 0.19333*** -0.0026
[0.84] [1.24] [7.59] [-0.73]
i. log pension wlth -0.21917*** 0.04374 1.00618*** 0.35971***
[-3.03] [0.46] [2.93] [2.76]
age/10 -0.82669 -0.174 2.76771 5.97727***
[-1.49] [-0.25] [1.17] [8.77]
age/10 sq -0.4501 0.02807 1.1377
[-1.51] [0.08] [0.93]
i. married 0.30576** 0.22676 0.95748 0.11253
[2.56] [1.22] [1.44] [0.51]
i. widowed -0.09638 -0.03524 -2.31054 2.63885***
[-0.29] [-0.08] [-1.30] [3.43]
i. other adults hh 0.0408 0.01997 -0.4418 -0.13514
[0.55] [0.19] [-1.09] [-0.97]  
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i. severe hlt -0.14116 -0.28910* -0.7671 0.00883
[-1.39] [-1.83] [-1.33] [0.04]
i. mild hlt -0.09004 -0.05958 -0.68700* -0.09531
[-1.33] [-0.63] [-1.88] [-0.69]
i. some iadl 0.1386 0.13947 -0.80109 -0.10549
[0.75] [0.56] [-0.92] [-0.39]
i. some adl -0.17996 -0.81376** -2.32868* -0.22171
[-0.75] [-2.17] [-1.79] [-0.50]
i. srh fair/poor -0.35146** -0.01868 -1.63467** 0.52869**
[-2.55] [-0.10] [-2.13] [2.07]
black -0.0032 -0.09819 -3.28271*** 0.0751
[-0.02] [-0.52] [-4.42] [0.28]
hispanic -0.15304 -0.34647 -2.77280*** -0.0878
[-1.07] [-1.61] [-2.93] [-0.32]
l.t. high school -0.08488 -0.1307 -1.85977*** -0.04964
[-0.70] [-0.75] [-2.60] [-0.21]
college ed 0.23080** 0.28027** 0.80724 -0.2346
[2.38] [1.99] [1.48] [-1.32]
i. non-labor income 0.00147 0.00152 0.06762*** -0.01006***
[1.31] [1.06] [8.18] [-4.20]
i. career occup. 0.00229 -0.08584 -0.23172 -0.29484*
[0.02] [-0.70] [-0.45] [-1.81]
i. professional 0.08596 0.20266 1.85221*** -0.62205***
[0.80] [1.33] [3.16] [-3.24]
i. blue-collar 0.01404 0.02554 0.01611 0.08062
[0.15] [0.18] [0.03] [0.42]
i. quarters cov. -0.00045 0.00820** -0.01987 0.00984**
[-0.18] [2.35] [-1.35] [1.98]
i. log aime 1.34329 -3.77934***18.77222*** 0.17728
[1.31] [-2.81] [3.07] [0.07]
i. wage rate 0.0007 -0.00215 -0.00686 -0.00573**
[0.32] [-0.93] [-0.56] [-2.07]
i. any pension 0.63094*** -0.02524 0.61788 -0.37856
[3.22] [-0.10] [0.65] [-1.13]
i. subj.prob.work62 0.00822*** -0.00454** -0.01983*** -0.01397***
[6.59] [-2.20] [-2.91] [-5.12]
i. subj.prob.work65 0.00222 0.00630*** -0.00547 0.00244
[1.45] [2.71] [-0.68] [0.87]
i. subj.prob.live75 0.00009 0.00013 0.0057 0.00087
[0.07] [0.07] [0.74] [0.32]
i. prob missing -0.21188 -0.21373 -0.5083 -0.41073
[-0.91] [-0.74] [-0.39] [-0.97]
Notes: point estimates along with t-statistics based on panel robust standard 
errors, *** <0.01, ** <0.05, * <0.10  
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Source:  CPS data. 
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Figure 8: Comparison of Simulated Social Security Benefits for 1931-1941 and 













62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70







Appendix 1:      
 
Estimating pension entitlements relating outcomes to baseline pension reports  
 Estimating pension entitlements from self-reports has been deemed difficult due 
to the large number of survey items involved, item-nonresponse affecting each one of 
them and the more general concern that workers do not actually know much about their 
pensions. (Mitchell, 1988) and Gustman and Steinmeier (2005).  Administrative data on 
the other hand have the shortcoming that they tend to be available only for a sub-sample 
of a survey raising the potential for biased results due to selection.  Here we use an 
alternative approach that relies exclusively on self-reported pension information, but 
allows for measurement error along a number of dimensions, including whether the 
person is covered by a pension in the first place, but also plan type.  
 
 The starting point of this approach is that the individual will have most accurate 
knowledge about his or her pension arrangements on a job (pension type and pension 
value) at the time of job separation.  At this time the person either starts receiving a 
pension or has to make some real world decisions about how the funds will be handled 
(cash out, roll-over into IRA, partial lump-sum, accumulate with employer etc.).  In the 
next HRS survey wave following this event, the respondents are asked for a full 
inventory of pensions on the job that the person just recently quit, including number of 
pensions, respective pension type, disposition of that pension and the associated amounts.   
 
Method: 
We estimate the probability of pension receipts (any receipts and the associated amounts) 
as a function of self-reported characteristics at baseline.  We estimate this relationship for 
the HRS cohort which was first interviewed in 1992 at age 51-61 and who has since been 
interviewed a total of eight times over a period of 14 years.  The vast majority of these 
initial respondents has retired by the time of the last interview (2006) or quit the 
employer they were working for back in 1992.  By 2006 they have reached age 65 to 75.  
For each worker in 1992 we follow them over time in the HRS survey and find the time 




Take the sample of all workers (Rs reporting a current job) at baseline (i.e. 1992).  
Include also those workers who report not being included in a pension plan at the 
time of interview as these workers may well become eligible for inclusion in a 
pension plan over time (or realize that they actually had been included).     
 
Follow all these workers over time and find when they leave the job they held in 
1992.  At that point HRS takes another inventory of Rs pensions and in particular 
what these pensions are worth at the time of job separation.  Labeling what Rs get 
from their pension(s) at this point as “pension extractions” we distinguish five 
types of extractions that are identified in the survey at job separation: 
 DC extractions 
 DB extractions – current lump sum 
 DB extractions – current flow 
 DB extractions – future flow 
 DB extractions – future lump sum 
 
 
Estimate probability of extraction:   
For the sample of all workers we estimate the probability of an extraction (using a 
logit specification); we perform a separate estimation for each type of extraction 
(i.e. 5 equations) as a function of covariates (covered by union, any pension, 
number of pensions, any DB, any DC, any DK type, a reduced set of industry and 
occupation dummies, sex, education, and age).  The set of industry and 
occupation dummies differs slightly across the different extractions equations to 
maximize predictive power (and reduce noise in predictions). 
 
Estimate amounts conditional on extractions:   
conditional on having an extraction of a particular type, we estimate the 
associated amount as a function of covariates (tenure on current job, any DB, any 
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DC, any type DK, sex, union, education, age, earnings on current job, current DC 
balance (1st through 3rd plan), expected DB benefit amounts (1st through 3rd plan). 
 
The total present value of expected pension wealth for a worker is defined by 
 
( )( ) ( | )t i i i
i
PV PW P extraction E PV extraction= ⋅∑  
where i = 1…5 denotes the five types of different pension extractions listed above. 
 
Note that amounts (extractions and amounts reported at baseline) are adjusted to be 
comparable across the type of pensions and the types of extractions.  This involves: 
 
- present value calculations for benefit flows (taking into account probabilities of 
survival); this is to achieve comparability of DB flows to stock measures like DC 
balances 
 
- discounting so that amounts measured at different points in time are comparable; 
discounting also captures the respondent’s distance to claiming the respective 
benefits (e.g. benefits expected in the far future versus those expected in the near 
future.) 
 
Interpretation of the resulting estimates of pension entitlements:   
This approach is equivalent to estimating the probability of extractions for each single 
period and then multiplying by the associated amounts conditional on receipt, and 
integrating over all future periods.  The resulting pension wealth measure is forward-
looking in that it does not give the value of pension entitlements if the worker were to 
quit in the current period, but instead the expected present value of future pension 
receipts for the group of workers with similar characteristics and pensions.  It varies from 
time period to time period as a function of the worker’s reported characteristics which is 
mainly by age; but also when the individual changes his or her reports about pension 
characteristics. 
